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Many jurisdictions adopt, as their touchstone inresolving parenting disputes, the ‘best interests ofthe child’ principle.  The difficulties in applying this
concept are well known.  In many instances its application
is shaped by mandatory considerations, one common
consideration being the child’s wishes and views.
Incorporating the views of children in the family law
process is not contentious; however there has been much
discussion as to how to obtain, and interpret, those views
and wishes.  In particular, there are diverse opinions on
whether children should talk directly to judges¹.  This is the
case, even though there is mounting evidence that
children’s interests are advanced by more direct
participation².   
In Australia judges can, and sometimes do, meet with
children outside of the courtroom.  However, children can
only give evidence or even be present in court with the
consent of the judge, which is rarely given. The reticence of
the Australian judiciary to embrace direct participation of
children has recently been highlighted by the work of
Fernando, whose survey of judges confirmed what was
generally understood; namely, that very few Australian
judges interview children and many are strongly opposed
to the practice³.  In place of direct communication
between children and judges, the common way of bringing
the voice of the child into court is the use of reports by
social scientists (what is known in Australia as a Family
Report)⁴. However, there continues to be concern
expressed as to whether this is the optimal way of
including children’s voices⁵.   
Not all Australian family court judges are, however,
opposed to the practice.  In adding to the growing
literature on the benefits of direct communication with
children, and in assessing any adverse consequences of the
practice, it is instructive to reflect on the experiences of
judicial activists in this area.  In Australia, the most vocal
member of the judiciary in favour of this practice has been
The Honourable Alastair Nicholson AO, RFD, QC, former
Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia.  Nicholson
was one of few judges to support and adopt this practice.
In this article we will focus on the experiences of one of
Australia’s leading family law judges to shed further light
on the difficult, and unresolved, question of children’s
participation in parenting disputes. We apply a common
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method in the social sciences called Key Informant
Technique⁶.  It is a qualitative ethnographic research
method with the advantage of generating high quality
data in a limited period of time from an expert source of
information. Several criteria have been suggested for such
a source such as: role in community, knowledge,
willingness, communicability and impartiality⁷.  The core
of the article therefore reflects an interview with our
selected key informant, Justice Nicholson⁸,  who can be
construed as an ideal such informant for this topic. The
article does not purport to provide any empirical or
measurable data on the topic.  Rather, it focuses on His
Honour’s personal reflections on this issue, drawn from a
lifetime career in Australia’s family law courts.  Moreover,
given that participation of children is relevant to all
parenting cases, the discussion sets the issue within the
broader context of the difficulty of making parenting
decisions under the best interests model.
Nicholson has stood out amongst his peers as a judge
open to the idea of interviewing children, and even more
rarely, prepared to do it.  The current Chief Justice, Diana
Bryant, does not share Nicholson’s enthusiasm for the
practice, although she is currently considering studies to
examine whether there are better ways of conveying to
children that the views that they expressed were in fact
taken into account. Given the degree of judicial discomfort
with this practice evidenced in Fernando’s survey, it is
timely to reflect on the experiences of a strong advocate
for children’s rights.  His insights provide further support
for those who advocate that children deserve to have their
voices heard more directly in family court.  Before turning
to Justice Nicholson’s views, we have set out the legal
context for children’s participation in the Australian family
courts. 
The Australian legal context
Despite considerable amendment in 2006 to Part VII
of the Family Law Act (1975) (FLA)⁹,  the basic principle
remains that the paramount consideration in making any
parenting order in Australia is the best interests of the
child.  The views and wishes of the child have long been a
mandatory statutory consideration for decision makers.
There is considerable discretion afforded as to the weight
to be attached to a child’s wishes; the words of the statute
permit the court to take account of ‘any’ factors relevant
to weight, ‘such as the child’s maturity or level of
understanding’¹⁰.  However, since 2006 this consideration
(like most others) has moved from being one in a general
list, to one in a list of ‘additional’ matters¹¹.  ‘Primary
considerations’ are now promoting meaningful
parental/child relationships and protecting children from
abuse¹².   There have been judicial statements to the effect
that, in certain cases, additional considerations may
outweigh primary considerations¹³; nonetheless, as a
matter of pure statutory interpretation, the fact that
children’s wishes are an additional, and not primary,
consideration arguably must have some impact on the
exercise of discretion.  
Australian case law has long established that a child’s
wishes cannot be discounted simply on the basis of age
alone¹⁴,  and that, where a child’s wishes are not followed,
explicit judicial reasoning must be provided¹⁵.  There has
not been any research on the extent to which children’s
wishes have impacted on outcomes; debate in Australia
has focussed rather on the relative merits of introducing
the wishes of children through third parties as opposed to
judges talking directly with children.
There are three main ways the wishes of children can
be introduced in Australian family courts¹⁶.  All matters
going to trial will have a Family Consultant appointed, and
that court based social scientist will very often be charged
with incorporating into their report to the court any wishes
of the child and their recommendations as to those wishes.
In some, but not all, cases, an Independent Children’s
⁶ M N Marshall, ‘The key informant technique’ (1996) 13(1) Family Practice 92.
⁷ ibid with further references to M Tremblay, in Field-Research: a Sourcebook and Field Manual, Allen and Unwin, London, 1989.
⁸ Conducted by Prof Eva Ryrstedt. The interview was conducted in December 2009 for the ultimate purpose of considering how Swedish law
reform in this area might be influenced by the Australian experience; see the discussion of the Swedish position in  Ryrstedt, Young and
Nicholson, The voice of the child in Swedish family law, (2012) 3 FLP 1.
⁹ This is the part of the Act which deals with parenting disputes.
¹⁰ FLA, s 60CC(3)(a).
¹¹ Compare FLA s 60CC(2) and s 60CC(3)..
¹² FLA, ss 60CC(2)(a) and (b).
¹³ M and S (2007) 37 Fam LR 32; FLC 93-313 per Desau J at [33].
¹⁴ Marriage of Joannou (1985) FLC 91-531.
¹⁵ Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 at 825 per Baker J.
¹⁶ FLA, s 60CD(2) expressly states that the court may inform itself of a child’s views by such means as the court considers appropriate.
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Lawyer¹⁷ will be appointed, and they must advise the
court of any wishes of the child, and can make
recommendations in that regard.  Finally, the FLA
contemplates the possibility of children talking directly
with judges, a practice known as ‘judicial conferencing’.  As
Fernando has confirmed with her recent empirical work,
this is very uncommon, and the specific provision dealing
with it has in fact recently been removed from the Family
Court Rules.  Nonetheless, it is open to decision makers,
subject to meeting the requirements of procedural
fairness, to speak directly with children.  
In terms of the Australian experience, Fernando points
to the following arguments in favour of judicial
conferencing as a complement to Family Reports:
• Clarification of evidence
• Introduction of current and important 
information that might not otherwise come 
before the court
• Ensuring decisions are made on the best available 
evidence
• Improved probative value of children’s evidence 
by avoidance of a ‘filtering’ process
• Direct contact with a child may enhance judicial 
focus on the particular child’s needs and best 
interests and the judge can discuss with them 
possible parenting options
• Reducing delay in urgent matters
• Meeting the (documented) desires of children to 
meet with decision makers, which has been 
shown to benefit children
• Recognition of children’s rights as set out in 
international law 
On the other hand, there is concern, including amongst
family court judges themselves, that judges lack the
expertise to take and interpret the evidence of children¹⁸
and have insufficient understanding of child
development¹⁹.  Further, judges are hesitant about
children being further enmeshed in parental conflicts and
being subjected to increased parental manipulation²⁰.
There are also the obvious concerns about ensuring
procedural fairness when information that may be heavily
relied upon by a judge is not taken in the more typical,
formal way²¹.  
While Fernando’s survey of Australian judges found a
degree of openness to the practice of judicial conferencing,
this was more theoretical than real (given its rarity) and
30% of respondents were implacably opposed to the
practice²².   It is only with a change in judicial attitude that
there is likely to be a change in practice in Australia.
Indeed, if one looks across to Australia’s near neighbour,
New Zealand, a very similar legislative regime has seen
much greater use²³ of direct participation of children,
arguably because of greater judicial support for this
concept²⁴.   Given the crucial role that the attitude of
judges plays in Australia in this regard, in the remainder of
this paper we will focus on Justice Nicholson’s experiences
and views.
A judge’s experience
Alastair Nicholson was Chief Justice of the Family
Court of Australia for 16 years, retiring in 2004.  His
Honour is recognised as a leading international
campaigner for children’s rights and was founding patron
of Children’s Rights International; he is now Chair of the
Board of that organisation.  Both during his time as Chief
Justice and since his retirement, Nicholson has spoken out
publicly in support of concrete action being taken both in
Australia and overseas to advance children’s rights.  Unlike
many others on the bench, Nicholson was known to
support judicial conferencing, both in theory and in
¹⁷ Under FLA s 68L a lawyer for the child can be appointed by the court; this lawyer does not act for the child, bur rather advocates for the
child’s best interests; see N Ross, ’Legal Representation of Children’ in G Monahan and L Young (eds), Children and the Law in Australia,
LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008, pp 551-3.
¹⁸ R Chisholm, ‘Children’s Participation in Family Court Litigation’ (1999) 13 AJFL 197 at 203; J Cashmore, ‘Children’s Participation in Family Law
Matters’ in C Hallet and A Prout (eds), Hearing the Voices of Children: Social Policy for a New Century, Routledge Falmer, London, 2003, at 167; M
Fernando, ‘What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children’ (2012) 26 AJFL 51, p 65.
¹⁹ J Kelly, ‘Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in Custody and Access Disputes” Current Research and Practice’
(2002) 10 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law, at 154; M Fernando, ‘What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with
children’ (2012) 26 AJFL 51, p 66.
²⁰ M Fernando, note 3 above, p 66.
²¹ ibid, pp 68-71.
²² ibid, pp 67.
²³ In a study conducted of cases heard between 2001 and 2005, 41.5% of cases included a judicial interview with a child: P Tapp, ‘Judges are
Human Too: Conversation Between the Judge and a Child as a Means of Giving Effect to Section 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004’ (2006)
NZLR 35.
²⁴ M Fernando, note 3 above, pp 53-54.  See also the discussion in M Fernando, note 2 above.
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practice.  In this sense, therefore, he is something of a
rarity, and can provide insights into the practical benefits
of the process and reflect on the perceived dangers.  The
following discussion reflects the comments of Nicholson
in an interview that raised broad questions about judicial
conferencing within the Australian legislative context for
resolving parenting disputes more generally.
The inherent difficulties in applying the best interests
principle
Incorporating the views of children is part of the
general process of determining the best interests of a child.
Nicholson stressed the difficulties in applying this
notoriously nebulous concept; in practice, he says, one is
often faced with determining what is the ‘least worst’
alternative for the child²⁵.  While Australian family law
legislation provides a checklist of circumstances to be
taken into account, such a list can only ever assist to a
degree, given the very different circumstances of each
case.  At best it can give some rough guidance as to the
types of things that the parliament thought a decision
maker²⁶ ought to take into account in parenting disputes.  
However, as Nicholson points out, to a decision maker
it may sometimes seem easier to determine whether
something is not in the child’s best interest, rather than
whether something is. There are some things that a
decision maker may feel instinctively or otherwise know
are not good for the child.  A current parenting regime may
not, on any test, appear to a decision maker to be the best
arrangement for a child; however, in working out what is
best, an Australian family court decision maker must
usually²⁷ give significant consideration to shared
parenting, which was superimposed onto the question of
what arrangement is in a child’s best interests by the 2006
reforms.  In reconciling the statutory considerations, a true
inquiry into the child’s best interests may be lost, suggests
Nicholson. 
The inherent difficulty in applying the best interests of
the child test stems both from its cultural relativity and
from the possibility of natural ‘bias’ on the part of any
decision maker. All decision makers, and particularly those
exercising a discretion, as is usually the situation in family
law cases, are inevitably affected by their own background
and experience. Nicholson notes there is a clear risk that
a decision maker will be influenced by their personal
notion of what is good for children, whether or not they
understand this forms a part of their decision making
process. Nicholson considers that there is a real need for
judicial education in this area to enable judges to recognise
and have regard to this problem. Considerable work on this
issue was done by the Western Judicial Education Centre in
Canada and in the late 1990s a number of Australian
judges, including Nicholson, participated in courses
conducted by that Centre, both in Canada and Australia,
which addressed this problem. 
An obvious situation where such a bias might arise is in
a case where the contest for parenting rights is between an
indigenous and non-indigenous parent.  Decision makers
will invariably be white and middle aged; the potential for
that decision maker to exhibit a preference for a non-
indigenous caregiver is evident.  Indeed, this is precisely
why Nicholson was instrumental in persuading a previous
Attorney-General that the best interests checklist should
include very specific direction about the consideration of
issues particular to indigenous culture²⁸. There are
however many other cases where this situation applies.
Nicholson’s comments on the inherent difficulties of
applying the best interests test highlight the need for
decision makers to have the best, most current,
information on which to base their decisions; judicial
interviews with children are recognised as providing a
potential benefit in this regard²⁹. On the one hand,
Nicholson reminds us of the need for exercising caution in
relying on the unfettered exercise of judicial discretion to
ensure that the best possible decisions are made.  The
statutory guidelines are complex and bias (in a general
sense) is a natural part of all decision making.  Indeed, a
preconceived notion by a judge as to what might be best
²⁵ The notion of choosing the least worst outcome was raised in the seminal work of J Goldstein, A Freud and A Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child, 1973, Free Press, New York.
²⁶ Parenting decisions in Australia may be made by a range of judicial officers.
²⁷ Shared parenting must be actively considered by every decision maker where they have decided to order that the parents have ‘equal shared
parental responsibility’ (ESPR): FLA, s 65DAA.  ESPR is the equivalent to what was once called ’guardianship’ in Australian law; it is the
responsibility for major long-term issues affecting the child eg education, name, major medical decisions etc.  Prior to 2006 guardianship was
routinely joint, and since 2006 there has been a rebuttable presumption in favour of ordering ESPR: s 61DA.  Thus, in many cases, ESPR will be
ordered, and so shared parenting must be considered.  
²⁸ FLA, ss 60CC(3)(h) and 60CC(6).
²⁹ Fernando highlights this as one of the advantages of judicial conferencing: M Fernando, note 2 above, p 53.
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for a child, might best be reality checked by talking directly
to a child about what they see as the best outcome.
Nicholson’s comments also highlight that the legislative
provisions should be focussed on the process of gathering
relevant evidence, rather than on prescribing consideration
of particular parenting regimes regardless of the
circumstances.  This latter point is particularly forceful
given the growing body of evidence challenging the
benefit to children of the inclusion of legislative provisions
that require mandatory consideration of particular models
of shared parenting³⁰. 
The judge’s ultimate dilemma 
Nicholson identifies two circumstances that stand out
as presenting particular difficulties when making a
parenting decision.  These sets of circumstances appear as
diametric opposites.  The first is where both parents
present as decent people and where each of them on their
own would make an excellent parent for the child.  The
one flaw the parents exhibit is their inability to agree on a
reasonable parenting arrangement.  Such a scenario, says
Nicholson, has the danger of leading to what might be
described as the easy way out – ‘sharing’ the child.  Such
an outcome is intuitively attractive and difficult to avoid
under the current Australian legislative regime, which
prioritises shared parenting; moreover, not reaching such
a conclusion could lead to the child being unnecessarily
deprived of the real value that might be derived from the
child spending more time with one or other parent.  
Nicholson is alluding to the fact, however, that sharing
the child may not truly be a decision as to the best
interests of the child, which may be better advanced by
some other parenting arrangement were it possible for
these parents to facilitate such an arrangement. For
example, Nicholson points out that there are cases where
such ‘good’ parents have diametrically opposed parenting
styles to the point where a shared parenting arrangement
leads to confusion and uncertainty on the part of the child
when he or she is transported from one household to the
other. It is often said that hard cases make bad law; in
family law, finely balanced cases have the potential to lead
to less good decisions for children than in cases where the
outcome is more obvious.  At least in this scenario,
however, the dangers to the child of a less than perfect
outcome are less concerning than one might imagine in
Nicholson’s alternate scenario.
At the other extreme, and a case where an imperfect
outcome due to the difficulty of the case presents much
greater risks to children, is the situation where there has
been an allegation of sexual abuse against one of the
parents.  As Nicholson stresses, these are the kinds of hard
cases where often a ‘least worst’ outcome has to be
chosen by the decision maker.  Very often a decision maker
will be left with a situation where abuse is not proved, but
there is a disconcerting possibility that abuse has occurred.
As many commentators have noted, the dangers of
excluding a child from contact with a parent in
circumstances where no abuse has occurred have to be
weighed against the risk of permitting contact where
abuse has occurred³¹.   A corollary of this problem is the
risk that the allegation of abuse has been falsely made by
the other parent³².  If this is the case (and this can be very
difficult to establish) it will tell strongly against such a
parent having care and control of the child. The stark
reality is that, either way, the wrong decision could have
disastrous implications for the child. 
Nicholson’s scenarios highlight the limitations of a
process that seeks to predict - at one point in time - best
outcomes for children based on often imperfect past
evidence.  That is a very tall order, at least if one expects
best possible outcomes for children.  And it will invariably
be the hardest of all cases that end up being resolved in
court; when the evidence falls such that a Solomon’s
choice has to be made, one wonders whether an outsider
might look at the process and consider it to be something
of a lottery.  
Given this, it might also seem strange to an outsider
that the person most directly affected by such ‘line-ball’
decisions is not directly heard in court.  Both cases present
scenarios where it might be argued that the proper and
timely inclusion of direct input from children might
increase the chance of the decision maker coming down
on the best side for the child. 
³⁰ B Fehlberg, B Smyth, M Maclean and C Roberts, Legislating for shared time parenting after separation: A research review, (2011) 25
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 318 pp 320-321.
³¹ For a discussion of the issues, see R Chisholm, Child abuse allegations in family law cases: A review of the law, (2011) 25 AJFL 1; J Fogarty AM,
’Unacceptable risk – A return to basics’ (2006) 20 AJFL 249.
³² As to the likelihood of false allegations, and the actual difficulty of disproving them, see L Young, Child sexual abuse allegations in the Family
Court of Western Australia: An Old Light on an old problem, (1998) 3 Sister in Law 98.
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The adversarial system – part of the problem?
Justice Nicholson noted that, in his experience, one
worrying aspect of the adversarial approach to child
proceedings was that it often led to undue focus on trivial
or irrelevant disputes about past events; the best interests
of the children could be subsumed as the parents engaged
in a cathartic exercise in which each sought to show the
other one up.  The nature of the adversarial system was
such that it was very difficult for the judge to interfere.  In
addition, an overly adversarial approach had the
disadvantages of increasing costs for parties and
exacerbating the levels of aggression between them.
Evidential objections would be raised based on very
technical grounds.  All of this had the potential to distract
the court from the real issue, which was what was best for
the children in the future. 
The 2006 reforms to the FLA included amendments
designed to reduce the adversarial nature of parenting
disputes (known as the ‘less adversarial trial’ (LAT)).  The
LAT was introduced after a project run by Justice
Nicholson and was inspired by a model from Germany. The
German model³³,  which departs considerably from
models in jurisdictions with an historical preference for
adversarial style litigation, provides the opportunity – from
the very outset of the matter - for the judge to have
contact with the child. Moreover, special consideration is
given to this occurring in a physical space (including
outside the court) that is less confronting for the child in
question.
The Australian program lacks these particular child
oriented features and this is arguably one of its
weaknesses. However, the more child oriented approach
that it does involve has allowed for the parties to be
brought together with their lawyers, and a
judge/magistrate, right at the start of the process, and
only after dispute resolution has been unsuccessful. The
ultimate decision maker is then able to define the issues
with more direct involvement of the parties – this helps to
avoid a purely legal defensive response.  By allowing much
greater judicial control over proceedings, from the very
start the decision maker can identify the relevant evidence
required and the relaxation of the rules of evidence
afforded under a LAT provides greater judicial flexibility.
Justice Nicholson’s early experience with the LAT
process was that there was a startling increase in the
appreciation of the parties of the true nature of child
proceedings and a feeling that the essential issues were
really being faced. At the same time, however, Nicholson
notes that from the outset, some of the more ‘traditional’
judges – and also some lawyers – struggled with the
breadth of the changes and were keen to find ways to
move back into their comfort zone – namely a more
adversarial hearing.
The LAT provides a very real opportunity for more
direct participation of children in parenting disputes.
Decision makers are involved at the outset, have more
control over the process and evidence and can assess when
and what input might assist from a child.  While there has
been no research to date specifically focusing on the
impact of the LAT as distinct from the trial models of a LAT
that preceded it, there are still significant obstacles as
Fernando’s research suggests, to its extension in a manner
that more directly follows the German model.
One major defect of the LAT as incorporated into the
FLA was that its use is optional at the direction of the trial
judge or magistrate. Nicholson reports that judges have
told him that the LAT places a much higher degree of
responsibility upon the trial judge and requires a much
higher degree of involvement by the judge in the process
of the trial than is the case in an adversarial trial. While
many judges relish this opportunity, there has been a
natural tendency for some judges who are set in their ways
or who are less energetic to revert to the adversarial
system, often encouraged by lawyers appearing before
them who lose most of their control over the litigation
under the LAT.
Some judges and former judges have resented the
suggestion that they see as implicit in the LAT, that family
court trials have been unsatisfactory in the past, and which
minimises their contribution to the development of family
law. This is an unfortunate response as what lies behind
the LAT is not a criticism of those who made the best of
the previous system but rather an attempt to improve that
system by changes in the law that take the best from other
systems and incorporate them into Australian family
law³⁴. 
The judge talking to a child: one judge’s experience
As indicated above, talking directly to a child in
chambers in family law cases is permissible in Australia,
³³ See Ryrstedt, Young and Nicholson, The voice of the child in Swedish family law, (2012) 3 FLP 1, referring to M Harrison, Finding a better way:
A bold departure from the traditional common law approach to the conduct of legal proceedings, Family Court of Australia, 2007 available at
www.familycourt.gov.au (accessed 8 January 2013).
³⁴ This is not to suggest that the introduction of the LAT has not been embraced by many judicial decision makers and has not brought
significant improvements in areas other than direct participation of children: see M Harrison, ibid.
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however remains uncommon.  Justice Nicholson confirms
that it has been a deliberate practice in Australia over the
years not to involve children directly in the proceedings,
relying rather on reports from counsellors; judges have an
historical track record of being very wary about talking to
children. However Nicholson considers that judicial
interviews with children should be an essential
concomitant of the LAT.
Two main concerns, as indicated above, about judicial
conferencing are procedural fairness and lack of judicial
skill in interviewing children. In relation to procedural
fairness, Justice Nicholson confirmed that prior to the
2006 reforms, judicial wariness about interviewing
children was motivated, at least in part, by concerns that
decisions should not be made on material that was not
put to the parties. Justice Nicholson pointed out, however,
that there were always ways of dealing with this issue.  It
was open to the judge to see and talk to a child, then to go
back into court, report what the child had told the judge
and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.
Another approach, which he has used, has been to ask the
children if they would be prepared to talk to a family
counsellor (it would now be a Family Consultant) and
convey to them what they have told the judge. If the
children agree, a further report from the Family Consultant
would be ordered which would permit the information to
be introduced to the court in a legally admissible form.
Nicholson acknowledges the difficulties with
interviewing children and in particular the need to disclose
what they have said to the parents.  He noted this was not
always what children wanted and this could leave a judge
in a problematic situation where he/she could not be
specific about the information that led to their ultimate
decision.  Justice Nicholson also highlighted the
importance, in deciding whether to interview a child, of
assessing whether the parents would be able to accept
what has been divulged so as to avoid negative
consequences for the children.
Nicholson accepts that the reaction of parents to what
children reveal to a judge will of course depend much on
their character.  However, he reported that some parents
were quite pleased that the children had had the
opportunity to participate in the process. Indeed, in his
experience, there seemed rarely to be any real hostility by
parents to a judicial conference with the child.  Indeed, his
Honour went on to say that parents may, in fact, be
suspicious of what the Family Report says; however, if it is
confirmed by what the child says to the judge, this can
improve the situation somewhat for the parents.  This in
turn may make it easier for parents to reach an agreement.  
Of course, on some occasions what a child reports to a
judge can be very confronting and disappointing for some
parents.  Nicholson points out that judges are cognisant of
the possibility of children being punished or reprimanded
for the views expressed by them, however, this can arise
whether they have spoken to a judge or a Family
Consultant.  As the court has no contact with the family
after the decision is made there is little opportunity to
know if this has occurred and this is obviously something
that is very difficult for judges to reconcile.
In this respect, Justice Nicholson points out that a
decision can be based on what the children say to a judge
they want, without disclosure of precisely what has been
said.   However, as Justice Nicholson points out, if the child
has expressed his or her wishes clearly, whether to a
Family Consultant, a judge or an ICL, the judge must still
explain their reasoning in their decision and why the
wishes of the child are not being followed, where this is
the case. In Nicholson’s view, the older the child the more
extended the explanation should be. Thus, there will
always have to be disclosure to some degree.
As has been noted, research is supporting the
conclusion that there are benefits for children in being
permitted an interview.  Nicholson’s experience confirms
this; he found children appreciated being able to talk to
the actual decision maker. They appreciated being
consulted in something that fundamentally affected
them, even if their view did not prevail. The fact that the
judge was prepared to have a conversation with them and
to explore their views and took those into account made
for a very positive experience for them.
In relation to the issue of lack of judicial skill, Nicholson
accepts that the way an interview is carried out is crucial.
Children need to feel at ease and so, while they can be
seen in rooms inside the court, it may be appropriate to
see them in another more neutral environment.  However
he notes that the lack of judicial conferencing contributes
to a judge’s lack of experience.  Judges may then be left to
rely on their own personal experiences of parenting.  It will,
of course, often be difficult to determine what a child
actually wants.  In addition to listening to what children
tell a judge directly, they will need to take account of
evidence as to what children have told neutral witnesses
or Family Consultants.  The interpretation of a child’s
wishes can be extremely difficult; while age is a factor,
children may also want to protect parents, keep them both
happy or even present a view to support a particular
parent.
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Justice Nicholson also emphasised the importance of
reports from Family Consultants; in that sense, judicial
conferencing is complementary to Family Reports³⁵.  In
addition to disclosing information that might not be
brought forward by, or even be known by, the parties’
lawyers, reports are very likely to address matters that will
be of great importance to the judge’s final decision.
Indeed, Justice Nicholson emphasised that, even when a
child is interviewed by a judge, the Family Consultant’s
report will often be used to the same extent as where
there is no interview, as very often there is conformity
between what is in the report and what the child discloses
to the judge.  However, the additional information
obtained from an interview with a child provides an
opportunity to test the report; if the report differs from
what the children report as their wishes in a judicial
conference, the judge can use this to qualify the report.
This additional information will provide a better backdrop
against which to assess the weight that should be attached
to the recommendations in the report.  In Nicholson’s
experience, on occasions there can be quite significant
differences between what the report says about the
children and what the judge discovers from a face to face
interview with the child.  In addition, Nicholson notes that
some children feel pressured, when interviewed by a
Family Consultant, to provide a particular view and this is
a further reason to read the report with caution when it
conflicts with what the judge has been told by the child.
The judge is then left with the task of forming an
assessment as to what the child actually wants, however,
with better evidence than would be provided by the report
alone.  
Nicholson says that the most difficult situation he has
encountered when interviewing a child is where the child
is mute and clearly does not wish to engage.  Such
situations can arise and raise the question of how the
matter proceeded to the point of an interview without this
being known.  Under the FLA children are not required to
express their views and it should only ever occur after a
child has been asked if they wish to participate in this way.
However in every instance where this occurred, the child
or children were asked if they wished to see the judge and
had agreed to do so. Normally they were seen in the
presence of the family counsellor and the ICL. Where a
child is then reticent, it may be that they have felt
overcome by the circumstances or have been discouraged
by a parent or parents from saying anything.
Nicholson considers that if there was a regular practice
of judges seeing children, particular attention should be
paid to where such interviews take place and who should
be present. In this regard, he feels there is much to be said
for the more informal German system.
Another difficult situation according to Nicholson is
where the child is adamant about what he or she wants,
but it may be that this is due to the child appreciating that
one of their parents has a particular need for support from
the child, for example because of alcoholism or other
illness. In such a case, Nicholson suggests a judge may take
account of the child’s view, but would not give it
determinative weight. 
In regard to specific training for judges, Nicholson
acknowledges that judges in Australia have usually been
skilful and successful legal practitioners prior to their
appointment.  However, the role of judge is very different
from legal practice, and he suggests a judicial tendency
can be detected where some judges assume they have
‘done it all’ and really do not need a lot more training.
Nicholson supports the notion that a judge’s practical
legal experience needs to be coupled with better judicial
education in many areas. In his view, the issue of how to
interpret and deal with children should be the subject of
quite significant judicial education because only a few
judges would have had significant prior experience in this
field. 
Nicholson noted that a judicial educational experience
regarding gender issues was conducted some years ago.  It
was very much directed at the danger of judges their using
own experience in the interpretation of evidence; in his
view this challenged many of the participants, but the
majority found it to be extremely helpful. This lesson can
also be transferred to other areas and no doubt greater
training in relation to interviewing children would aid in
avoiding the reliance of judges on personal experience.
Nicholson does not suggest that judges should be
educated on these issues to the point of becoming experts
in their own right but they should develop a significant
understanding of the issues and be able to communicate
with children to the point of putting them at their ease.
As noted by Nicholson, one of the greatest difficulties
faced by judges is not having sufficient material before
them to decide a matter.  With the LAT judges now have
the opportunity of identifying where there is insufficient
evidence and what evidence they would like.  This would
be the case where there is conflicting evidence; so if a
³⁵ See also M Fernando, note 2 above, pp 51-52.
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Family Consultant’s report conflicted with what the child
said in a judicial conference, this could be explored further
with the consultant in court.  In the case of children’s
wishes, the judge has to take account of the child’s age and
there are situations where the information can be
obtained without the need for direct recourse to a child.
However, Nicholson thinks that when assessing an
important matter, for example, the relationship between
a parent and a child, one must be cautious about relying on
third party evidence.  In other words, as Nicholson
identifies, there are significant benefits to judicial
conferencing.  Overall, and notwithstanding the difficulties
involved, Nicholson reports no instances in which he
regretted interviewing a child (which was normally in
unusual circumstances in any event) and noted that were
he hearing cases now, his preference would be to interview
children much more frequently.
In this regard it is of interest to note a recent article by
Justice Robert Benjamin of the Family Court of Australia
in which he supports the desirability of judges interviewing
children in appropriate cases and discusses his own
experiences of doing so³⁶. It is apparent that his
experiences accord with those of Nicholson and in the
cases to which he refers, the judicial conference was a vital
component in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion in the
cases in question.
Benjamin makes an interesting comparison with the
different approach of New Zealand judges to this issue³⁷.
While to some extent he puts this down to subtle but
important legislative differences, he also highlights judicial
critique in that country of the use of an adversarial system
in resolving parenting disputes³⁸.  Notwithstanding this, it
is apparent from Benjamin’s article that he does not feel
that an Australian judge is unduly constrained from
conducting a judicial conference and he has obviously
done so with success. 
Conclusion
The difficult application of the ‘the best interests of the
child’ concept poses problems in deciding some very
practical, and fundamental, aspects of a child’s life, most
usually with which parent the child is to live and when.
Maximising the right of children to express their wishes
and views should be of great assistance in deciding these
matters. This, however, does not seem to be sufficiently
appreciated. 
Almost invariably in Australia, the process is for a third
party to talk to the child and then convey the child’s views
and wishes to the court. The advantages of such a system
are obvious; the most important one being that the child
is affected as little as possible by the sometimes highly
adversarial situation between the parents. The
disadvantage on the other hand is that the wishes and
views of the child are filtered through a third person, who
is inevitably interpreting what the child is actually saying
– and in doing so that person is very often interpreting that
evidence in light of what that person  thinks are that child’s
best interests.  That is a decision for the judge.  This is
precisely why hearsay evidence was not generally
permitted in the past.  However, simply because hearsay
evidence is admissible for children, this does not mean we
should throw the baby out with the bathwater. The judge
will want to hear the views of the Family Consultant or ICL
as to the child’s best interests, but that is no reason for not
hearing the views of the child directly, just as the parents
have the opportunity to put their case directly.  Moreover,
even if a different decision does not result, there are
benefits for some children in simply being permitted to
participate in a decision-making process that
fundamentally concerns them.
There will of course be many cases where a child’s
views will not be crucial to a decision; however this does
not mean that interviewing children should be disregarded
in cases where the judge feels unsure of the true feelings
of the child (for example where the child may not have
understood the significance of their comments to a
decision) or that further input from the child may assist in
their decision making.     
Providing advanced training for judges to be able to
handle and interpret such interviews appropriately is a
small price to pay for the advantages for the child (both
emotionally and in terms of the decision) if the judge
speaks with the child directly.  Doing this in a formal way
in a courtroom could, of course, be a very frightening
situation for the child. However, in Australia, the judge can
adopt any method they choose, including meeting out of
the court.   The judge can ensure the child understands the
significance of the meeting, and the child can be protected
from the more severe setting of the courtroom. 
In reflecting on the best processes to advance children’s
interests in family law, it cannot be ignored that there is
mounting evidence that children’s interests are advanced
by more direct participation. Nicholson’s experiences
support this conclusion and give reason to expect that
³⁶ Benjamin, Justice Robert, Judges receiving evidence directly from children, (2012) 2 Fam L Rev. 99.
³⁷ See also the discussion in M Fernando, note 2 above and the research referred to therein in relation to New Zealand.
³⁸ See the discussion in M Harrison, note 33 above, pp 36-38.
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more positive outcomes can be achieved for both children
and parents.  Nicholson sees the greater inclusion of
children in the process as a way of minimising the effect of
natural bias in decision making, assisting in what are the
most difficult cases to decide, improving the likelihood of
the better parenting outcome being chosen and affirming
children’s rights to be heard fully when a matter concerns
them.  This would also reduce the possibility of the process
seeming arbitrary in the sense that all relevant
information is not properly considered.
As a by-product, Nicholson notes that there is an
increased possibility of parental satisfaction (and indeed
agreement) through the use of interviews.  Nicholson’s
experiences do not suggest that parents are hostile to the
judicious use of interviews and, providing judges are
sensitive to adverse consequences for children of
disclosure of information, there is every reason to suspect
that parents will benefit from greater use of interviews.
As we have seen, Nicholson’s experiences support the view
that children benefit personally from being included in the
process, beyond the question of what ultimate decision is
taken.  Indeed, one might question why, if a child
particularly wishes to, they would be denied the
opportunity of talking to a judge; it seems obvious to
suggest this could be more detrimental to children than
the risks associated with interviews.
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to see why judges in
Australia remain so reluctant to talk directly to children;
even when they express interest in the practice they rarely
do so.³⁹ Nicholson’s experiences – and he was the senior
judge in the court for many years – do not illuminate the
true reason for this judicial reluctance.  Nicholson
indicated that judges espoused procedural fairness and
lack of judicial skill in interviewing children as their driving
motivation.  However, as we have seen, these are not
insurmountable barriers to the practice.  Procedural
fairness can already be addressed, and further rules could
be adopted.  Appropriate interviewing skills are a matter
relevant both for third parties interviewing children and
judges and there is no reason why similar training for both
could not be provided on a regular basis.  While the judge
does not have a social science background, nor do police
officers, for example, who have to interview children.
Parenting disputes are core business for the family court;
what could be more important than education for judges
in this area?  Judges will come to the job with the legal
skills to act for a party but in making a decision about a
child’s life it is entirely appropriate that, as Nicholson
suggests, considerable effort should be devoted to up-
skilling judges in this way.
So far as the future of the less adversarial trial is
concerned, for the reasons already discussed, we think that
its future is inextricably bound with judicial conferencing.
It may be that the Australian judicial reluctance to
interview children reflects a continuing tie to the
traditional adversarial model. It is interesting to note that
in the family and the broader children’s jurisdictions at
least there is evidence of the beginning of a more general
acceptance of moving away from this traditional approach.
We have mentioned the situation in New Zealand where
both less adversarial style trials and judicial conferencing
are becoming increasingly more accepted.
The Australian and New Zealand trial models
have similarly been adopted in Singapore,
which has worked closely with the Family Court
of Australia over many years.  Very recently in
the State of Victoria, Australia, a public inquiry
into the State’s child justice system found:
[The VLRC (Victorian Law Reform Commission)
found] that the conduct of matters under
Division 12A of the Family Law Act is an
excellent model. The Inquiry agrees and
considers that the model should be adapted for
inclusion in the Act. The Inquiry endorses the
VLRC report’s recommendations regarding the
LAT model of the Family Court (VLRC 2010, pp.
314-317)...
The Inquiry recommends that the Children’s
Court be empowered, through legislative
amendment, to conduct matters in a manner
similar to the way in which the Family Court of
Australia conducts matters under Division 12A
of the Family Law Act⁴⁰. 
It is to be hoped that in the future this child friendly
model of family litigation will gain increasing acceptance
and that it will increasingly be coupled with judicial
conferencing as an integral aspect of its operation.
³⁹ M Fernando, note 3 above, p 76.
⁴⁰ Report of the Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry, State of Victoria, January 2012, Chapter 15.4, The Less Adversarial Trial Model,
http://www.childprotectioninquiry.vic.gov.au/report-pvvc-inquiry.html (accesssed 15 November 2012).
